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Abstract
Consider n individuals who, by popular vote, choose among q ≥ 2 alternatives, one of which
is “better” than the others. Assume that each individual votes independently at random, and
that the probability of voting for the better alternative is larger than the probability of voting
for any other. It follows from the law of large numbers that a plurality vote among the n
individuals would result in the correct outcome, with probability approaching one exponentially
quickly as n→∞.
Our interest in this paper is in a variant of the process above where, after forming their initial
opinions, the voters update their decisions based on some interaction with their neighbors in a
social network. Our main example is “majority dynamics”, in which each voter adopts the most
popular opinion among its friends. The interaction repeats for some number of rounds and is
then followed by a population-wide plurality vote.
The question we tackle is that of “efficient aggregation of information”: in which cases is the
better alternative chosen with probability approaching one as n → ∞? Conversely, for which
sequences of growing graphs does aggregation fail, so that the wrong alternative gets chosen
with probability bounded away from zero?
We construct a family of examples in which interaction prevents efficient aggregation of
information, and give a condition on the social network which ensures that aggregation occurs.
For the case of majority dynamics we also investigate the question of unanimity in the
limit. In particular, if the voters’ social network is an expander graph, we show that if the
initial population is sufficiently biased towards a particular alternative then that alternative
will eventually become the unanimous preference of the entire population.
1 Introduction
The mathematical study of voting systems began as early as 1785, when the Marquis de Condorcet[5]
observed what is essentially a special case of the weak law of large numbers: suppose there is a
large population of voters, and each one independently votes “correctly” with probability p > 1/2.
Then as the population size grows, the probability that the outcome of a majority vote is “correct”
converges to one. Thus, information is “efficiently aggregated”.
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In this work, we study a simple model of voter interaction, in which voters choose an independent
random opinion initially, but then modify that opinion iteratively, based on what their friends
think. Thus correlation between votes is introduced “naturally”, through interaction. Our main
example of interaction is majority dynamics, where at each round each voter adopts the opinion of
the majority of its neighbors. The basic question that we address is that of efficient information
aggregation: for which modes of interaction is information aggregated efficiently, and for which is
it not?
Additionally, we study some conditions for the achievement of unanimity, when the graph of
social ties is an expander, and when agents use majority dynamics.
1.1 Model
We consider an election in which a finite set V of voters must choose between q ≥ 2 alternatives,
which we will take to be the elements of [q] = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. The voters are connected by an
undirected social network graph G = (V,E). Denote the neighbors of v ∈ V by Nv.
Each voter v ∈ V will be initialized with a preference Xv(0) ∈ [q], picked independently from a
distribution P over [q].
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, v will update her opinion to Xv(t) based on what her friends’ opinions
at times t− 1 and earlier. At time T , an election will take place and a winner Y will be declared.
Note that Y is a deterministic function of the initial votes (Xv(0))v∈V .
A simple and important example is majority dynamics where q = 2: At each iteration of the
dynamics, each individual v sets her vote to equal the most popular vote among her neighbors in
the previous iteration (we elaborate below on the handling of ties).
Xv(t) = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{w|Xw(t− 1) = a, w ∈ Nv}|.
At some large time T an election by plurality takes place, so that the winner is
Y = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{v|Xv(T ) = a}|.
Note that the majority rule (or more generally the plurality rule, in the case of more than two
alternatives) is fair and monotone: It is fair in the sense that is does not, as an election system,
treat one alternative differently than another; it is invariant to a renaming of the alternatives. It
is monotone in the sense that having extra supporters cannot hurt an alternative’s case.
As a generalization of majority dynamics, we allow any updating of opinions and any election
system, provided that they are fair and monotone. For example, an individual may give more
weight to some of her friends than to others, and the final election could an Electoral College
system. In Sec. 5 we further relax the fairness condition.
1.2 Overview of the results
1.2.1 Social types
Our study of information aggregation will utilize the idea of social type: we divide the voters V
into a partition A of social types, and ask that any two voters of the same social type play the
same roˆle in the election process. More precisely we require that if the labels are removed from all
individuals then it is impossible to tell apart two individuals of the same social type. This shall be
rigorously defined in Section 2.
In the case of majority dynamics, social types are induced by the automorphisms of the graph
G: u,w ∈ V are of the same social type if there exists an automorphism τ of G such that τ(u) = w.
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Intuitively, this means that in an unlabeled drawing of G it is impossible to say which is u and
which is w; u and w are of the same social type if they play the same roˆle in the geometry of G,
and hence play the same roˆle in the election process.
1.2.2 Aggregation of information
Without loss of generality, we will assume that alternative 0 is the best alternative, and that
the initial opinion of each voter is slightly biased towards alternative 0: we take Xv(0) to be a
multinomial random variable such that P(Xv(0) = 0) > P(Xv(0) = j) for any j 6= 0.
Although this bias could be very small, the law of large numbers guarantees that with enough
voters, the outcome of a plurality vote at time 0 would choose the correct alternative, except with
exponentially low probability. We refer to this property as efficient aggregation of information.
In Section 3, we study if information is still efficiently aggregated if we hold the vote at time
T instead, after allowing the agents to interact. One of our main results (stated formally in
Theorem 3.1 below) is that information is efficiently aggregated when each social type has many
members. In particular, we show that the probability of choosing the correct alternative approaches
one as the size of the smallest social type approaches infinity, with a polynomial dependence.
This implies that in majority dynamics on a transitive graph, in which case all voters are of the
same social type, the outcome of the final vote will be zero, except with probability that decreases
polynomially with the number of voters.
1.2.3 Lack of Aggregation
Perhaps surprisingly, the condition requiring increasing size of each social type is necessary. Indeed
in Section 3.1 we provide an example with q = 2 alternatives, majority dynamics and a final
majority vote, which results in the wrong outcome, with constant probability regardless of the size
of the population!
1.2.4 Wider agreement, unanimity and expanders
In Section 5, we ask when, following T periods of interaction, a large part of the population is in
agreement.
Focusing on the case q = 2 and majority dynamics, we show that the proportion of the popula-
tion that votes for alternative 0 at time T is at least as large as the initial bias towards alternative
0.
We push the agreement threshold to its extreme in Section 6, where we show that if the social
network is an expander graph, the mode of interaction is based on plurality, and there is enough
initial bias then eventually the entire population will agree on alternative 0.
1.3 Related work
Our work is closely related to work of Kalai [15] who studies social choice using tools of discrete
Fourier analysis. Kalai proves that any binary unbiased and monotone election system aggregates
information efficiently, given that all the voters have low influence on the outcome.
Our work expands on this work in several directions: First, we elucidate the role of voters types
in this setup by showing that having large number of voters of each type implies aggregation and
that without this condition aggregation may not occur. Second, we go beyond the binary world
and explore general outcome spaces. Finally the questions of higher thresholds and unanimity were
not considered before.
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Kanoria and Montanary [17] study majority dynamics with two alternatives on regular (infinite)
tree graphs, giving conditions which lead to convergence to unanimity. Their work can also be
interpreted as a study of a zero temperature spin glasses, a model also studied by Howard [12] on
3-regular trees and Fontes, Schonmann and Sidoravicius [7] on Zd.
Berger [4] gives an example of a series of graphs in which majority dynamics results in the
adoption, by all individuals, of the opinion of the individuals in a constant size group, provided
they all agree. Thus these graphs could serve in place of our example (Section 3.1), showing how
aggregation fails when there is a small social type. We provide our example for completeness, and
because it is somewhat simpler.
Our work is related to the widely studied family of Gossip-based protocols on networks (see,
e.g., Bawa et al. [3], Kempe et al. [18], and a survey by Shah [23]). The goal there is to design
and/or analyze distributed, repeated algorithms for the aggregation of information on networks.
For example, in the classical DeGroot model [6] agents “vote” with a real number, which they
calculate at each iteration by averaging the votes of their neighbors from the previous iteration.
The agents all converge to the same number, which is a good approximation of the average of the
initial votes only if degrees are low [10], or if, indeed, the size of the smallest social type is large.
This model is fairly easy to analyze, since the votes in each iteration are a linear function of the
votes in the previous iteration. Majority dynamics is a natural discretization of this process, but
has proven to be more resistant to analysis. Indeed the non-linearity of the dynamics results not
only in major technical challenges but also in different behaviors of the two models.
Another related strain of models is that of Bayesian learning. Here the agents optimize their
votes to those which are the most likely to be correct, given a prior over correct alternatives, an
initial private signal and the votes of their neighbors in previous rounds (see, e.g., [21]). Perhaps
surprisingly, this dynamic is not necessarily monotone and therefore its analysis requires different
tools. The agents calculation there are more complicated, and hence more difficult to analyze.
On the other hand, the optimality of the agents’ actions makes the model amenable to martingale
arguments, which don’t apply in the case of majority dynamics.
Our main proof uses tools from the field of Fourier analysis of Boolean functions on the discrete
hypercube. In particular we use and extend results of Kahn, Kalai and Linial [13], Friedgut and
Kalai [8], a strong version of the KKL theorem by Talagrand [24] and a recent generalization by
Kalai and Mossel[16].
1.4 Acknowledgments
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2 Definitions and results
2.1 Majority Dynamics
Let V be a finite set of individuals. Let G = (V,E), an undirected finite graph, represent the
network of social connections of V . We denote the neighbors of v ∈ V by Nv. We allow G to
contain self-loops, so that v may or may not belong to Nv.
Let Xv(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote v’s vote at time t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Let each Xv(0) be chosen from some
distribution P over {0, 1}, independently and identically for all v ∈ V . Note that once the initial
votes (Xv(0))v∈V are chosen, the process is deterministic.
At times t > 0, v updates its vote to equal the majority opinion of its neighbors in the previous
round. If the number of neighbors is even then we either add or remove v itself to the set of
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neighbors Nv, to avoid ties.
Xv(t) = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{w|Xw(t− 1) = a, w ∈ Nv}|.
After some number of rounds T an election by majority takes place. We denote the winner by YT :
YT = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{v|Xv(T ) = a}|.
To avoid ties in the final election, we assume |V | is odd.
We next define social types. Recall that τ : V → V is a graph automorphism of G = (V,E) if
(u, v) ∈ E ↔ (τ(u), τ(v)) ∈ E. We say that u and v are of the same social type if there exists a
graph automorphism that maps u to v. Informally, this means that u and v play the same roˆle in
the geometry of the graph; it is impossible to tell which is which if the labels are removed from
the vertices. It is easy to see that “being of the same social type” is an equivalence relation. We
denote by A(G) the partition of the vertices of G into social types. We denote by m(G) the size of
the smallest social type:
m(G) = min
A∈A(G)
|A|.
Our main result in this section is that information is aggregated efficiently, provided that each
social type has many members. To state our result, we first define the efficiency of an aggregation
procedure. Let Pδ be the probability distribution {0, 1} such that Pδ(0) = 12(1 + δ) and Pδ(1) =
1
2(1− δ). Then the efficiency µδ(G,T ) of majority dynamics on G up to time T is
µδ(G,T ) = Pδ [YT = 0].
Note that in a slight abuse of notation we use Pδ to denote both the distribution over {0, 1} from
which Xv(0) is chosen, and the measure on (Xv(t))v∈V,1≤t≤T and YT which is induced by Pδ.
Our main result for this section is the following:
Theorem. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that for any graph G
µδ(G,T ) ≥ 1− C exp
(
−C δ logm(G)
log(1/δ)
)
.
In particular, µδ(G) approaches one as m(G) tends to infinity. Note that the bound does not
depend on T . This theorem is a special case of Theorem 3.1, which is stated below.
In the other direction, we provide an example showing what can go wrong when m(Gn) does
not grow to infinity.
Theorem 2.1. For any δ > 0, there exists a sequence of graphs Gn, whose sizes converge to
infinity, such that
sup
n
sup
T≥1
µδ(Gn, T ) < 1.
That is, there is some ǫ > 0 such that for any n and T the probability of choosing the wrong
alternative is at least ǫ.
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2.2 Monotone Dynamics
In this section we extend the definitions and results of the previous section to a large class of update
rules and election systems, and a choice between more than two alternatives.
Let [q] = {0, 1, . . . , q−1} be the set of alternatives. The initial votes Xv(0) are, as above, chosen
i.i.d. from some P, which is now a distribution over [q]. As before, the process is deterministic once
the initial votes are chosen.
Let the history of v’s neighborhood before time t be denoted by Hv(t) = (Xw(s))s<t,w∈Nv . Then
[q][t]×Nv is the set of possible histories of the neighborhood of v before time t.
For each a ∈ [q] and k ∈ N we define a relation ≥a on [q]k as follows. Let x, x′ ∈ [q]k. We write
x′ ≥a x if, for all i ∈ [k] it holds that
x′i 6= xi → x′i = a.
Alternatively, if a vector of votes x is changed to x′ such that x′ ≥a x, then for each i either xi is
unchanged, or it is changed to a. Note that when q = 2 then x′ ≥1 x reduces to the usual x′ ≥ x,
i.e., x′i ≥ xi for i ∈ [k].
For 0 < t ≤ T , let Xv(t) be determined as follows. Let the mode of interaction be a collection
of functions mv,t : [q]
[t]×Nv → [q], with
Xv(t) = mv,t(Hv,t).
These functions are generalization of the majority function used in majority dynamics. As such,
we require that they meet the following conditions:
1. They are fair, or symmetric with respect to the alternatives: for all permutations σ on [q]
and all histories h ∈ [q][t]×Nv , σ(mv,t(h)) = mv,t(σ(h)), where σ(h) is the result of applying
σ to each element of h.
2. They are monotone: for every pair h, h′ ∈ [q][t]×Nv , if mv,t(h) = a and h′ ≥a h then mv,t(h′) =
a.
An example would be majority dynamics, i.e., the case where q = 2, |Nv| is odd for all v, and mv,t
is equal to the most popular opinion among Xw(t− 1), where w ∈ Nv. A different simple example
is the case that Xv(t) is simply equal to Xv(t − 1), unless all of v’s neighbors agree in time t − 1
on some alternative a, in which case Xv(t) = a. That is, the agents do not change their opinions
unless their friends unanimously agree on a different opinion.
Following T rounds of interaction, we apply an election system function g : [q]V → [q] to
(X1(T ), . . . ,X|V |(T )), to determine the chosen alternative Y :
Y = g(X1(T ), . . . ,X|V |(T )).
This is again a generalization of a majority vote, and as such we require that g satisfy the same
fairness and monotonicity properties:
1. It is fair, or symmetric with respect to the alternatives: for all permutations σ on [q], σ(g(a)) =
g(σ(a)), where σ(a) is the result of applying σ to each element of a, av.
2. It is monotone: for every pair x, x′ ∈ [q]V , if g(x) = a and x′ ≥a x then g(x′) = a.
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Examples of such functions are the simple plurality function and various recursive plurality (i.e.,
electoral college-like) functions. Another important example is the dictator function, in which
g(a) = av, for some fixed v.
The whole process of social interaction and elections can be viewed as a single function from
the original signals {Xv(0)|v ∈ V } to [q]. We denote this function by f : [q]V → [q], and call it the
aggregation function, so that
Y = g(X1(T ), . . . ,X|V |(T )) = f(X1(0), . . . ,X|V |(0)).
Note that for brevity’s sake we sometimes write the above as Y = f(X). It is easy to see that the
aggregation function f has the same properties we that require from the election system g: it is
monotone and fair.
Finally, the concept of social types is, in the case of monotone dynamics, related to the sym-
metries of the aggregation function, rather than those of the graph. We first define H(f), the
symmetry group of the aggregation function, as the group of permutations τ on V that satisfy the
following condition: for every a ∈ [q]V it holds that f(τ(a)) = f(a), where τ(a)v = aτ(v).
It is easy to verify that H(f) is indeed a group, with composition as the operation: for any
τ, σ ∈ H(f) it holds that f(τ(σ(a))) = f(τ(a)) = f(a), and hence τσ ∈ H(f). Also, f(a) =
f(τ(τ−1(a))) = f(τ−1(a)), and so τ−1 is also in H(f).
The set of Social types is simply V/H(f), the set of orbits of V under the action of H(f). I.e.,
A(f) is the unique partition of V such that v,w ∈ V are of the same social type iff ∃τ ∈ H(f) such
that τ(v) = w.
The definition of m(G,T ) now naturally becomes the following. Given an aggregation function
f : [q]V → [q], denote by m(f) the size of the smallest social type induced by f :
m(f) = min
A∈A(f)
|A|.
Our main result of this section, which is a strict generalization of that of the previous, is again
that information is aggregated efficiently provided that each social type has many members. In the
case of monotone dynamics, our definition of the efficiency of aggregation is the following. Let Pδ
be the set of probability distributions P on [q] under which P(0) ≥ P(i) + δ for all i = 1, . . . , q− 1.
Then the efficiency µδ(f) of a function f : [q]
n → [q] is defined by
µδ(f) = inf
P∈Pδ
P[f(X) = 0].
Our main result for this section is the following:
Theorem 3.1. Let f : [q]V → [q] be a monotone and fair aggregation function, and let m = m(f)
be the size of the smallest social type. Then
µδ(f) ≥ 1− Cq exp
(
−Cq δ logm
log(1/δ)
)
,
for some Cq that depends only on q.
Theorem 3.1 is a statement about functions f such that m(f) is large. For q = 2 and odd n
it is easy to find examples of such functions - the majority function, for example. However, not
for every value of q, n and m ≤ n there exists a fair and monotone aggregation function fq,n such
that m = m(fq,n). In particular, it is not clear for which values of q and n there exists a fair and
monotone aggregation function fq,n that is transitive, i.e., m(fq,n) = n.
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The challenge is to break ties in a way that preserves fairness and transitivity, and indeed
it seems that no simple, immediate examples exist. We provide the following example of a fair,
transitive and monotone function, for any q ≥ 2 and n prime and larger than q. See further
discussion in [1].
Proposition 2.2. For all q ≥ 2 and n prime and strictly larger than q, there exists a monotone,
fair and transitive aggregation function f : [q]n → [q].
2.3 Unanimity results
Here we consider any number of alternatives q, but specialize to the case where the mode of
interaction is given by simple plurality. It is easy to construct examples showing that our earlier
assumptions on the structure of the network do not imply that the whole electorate will eventually
agree. Indeed, there could be a small clique of voters who are well-connected to each other but
poorly connected to the rest of the population. These voters could forever maintain an opinion
contrary to that of their peers. One way to avoid this situation is to ask that the social network
be an expander graph.
Let M be the adjacency matrix of a d-regular graph G. We say that G is a λ-expander graph
if the second-largest absolute eigenvalue of M is no larger than λ.
Although we will not require any knowledge of expander graphs here, we refer the uninitiated
reader to [11] for a survey on the topic. For now, it is enough to know that “good” expanders have
λ = O(
√
d).
Theorem 2.3. Let Gn be a sequence of d-regular λ-expanders whose size converges to infinity.
Suppose that λd ≤ 316 and
P(0) ≥ P(i) + c
√
log q√
d
(1)
for all i 6= 0. For v a vertex in Gn let Xv(t) be drawn i.i.d. from P, and let the mode of interaction
be majority dynamics. Then with probability converging to 1 as n→∞, there exists a time T such
that Xv(T ) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
The dependency on d in Eq. (1) is possibly not tight. In particular, if q = 2 and the girth of Gn
tends to infinity with n, then a result of Kanoria and Montanari [17] implies that we can replace√
d by dα for any α > 0.
2.4 Higher threshold results
For q = 2, consider the election system gα(x) = 1(
∑
i xi ≥ (1 − α)n). When α = 1/2, this is just
the simple majority function. It is monotone and symmetric and so Theorem 3.1 applies. When
α > 1/2, however, gα is no longer symmetric in the alternatives. We prove that the final bias is as
large as the expected initial bias.
Theorem 2.4. Let fn,α be a fair and monotone aggregation function with election system gn,α on
the graph Gn after running T rounds of interaction. If m(fn,α) →∞ and α < 12 + δ2 then for any
T ∈ N,
lim
n→∞µδ(fn,α) = 1.
We do not believe that the relationship between α and δ is the best possible. Note that for the
complete graph on n nodes, one can take α exponentially close to 1 for any δ. It is natural to guess
that the worst dependence on n occurs in a ring. For this case we show that one can take α as
large as 1− (1− δ)2/2.
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3 Aggregation of Information
In this section, we will prove the following theorem, using the definitions of Section 2.2.
Theorem 3.1. Let f : [q]V → [q] be a monotone and fair aggregation function, and let m = m(f)
be the size of the smallest social type. Then
µδ(f) ≥ 1− Cq exp
(
−Cq δ logm
log(1/δ)
)
,
for some Cq that depends only on q.
The proof of this theorem relies on a “sharp threshold” theorem of Kalai and Mossel [16] (which
is itself an extension of Talagrand’s theorem [24] to the case q > 2). Sharp threshold theorems
go back to Margulis [19] and Russo [22]; Friedgut-Kalai [8] and Kalai [14] apply sharp threshold
theorems in contexts similar to this one. In fact, the result of [14] gives a weaker version of
Theorem 3.1 in which each social type must have at least n/o(log n) members.
A crucial ingredient for sharp threshold results is the notion of influence, which we will define
for a function f : [q]n → {0, 1}. Let P be a probability measure on [q], and denote also by P the
corresponding product distribution over [q]n. The influence of voter i on a function f : [q]n → {0, 1}
is
Ii
P
(f) = EPVarP(f(X1, . . . ,Xn)|X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn). (2)
Kalai and Mossel [16] prove the following inequality:
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that P(a) ≥ α > 0 for every a ∈ [q]. If maxi IPf (i) ≤ ǫ then
n∑
i=1
IiP(f) ≥ C log n
log(1/ǫ) − log(1/4)
log(1/α)
VarP(f)
for a universal constant C.
Before proving Theorem 3.1 we will require a simple definition and Lemma. Let P be a probabil-
ity distribution on [q] such that P(0) > 0. Define the following family of distributions Pt (indexed
by t ∈ [0, 1]) as follows:
Pt(a) =
{
t a = 0
(1− t)P(a|a 6= 0) a > 0.
Note that PP(0) = P.
Lemma 3.3. Let P be a probability distribution on [q] such that P(0) = P(1) + δ for some δ > 0.
Let s be such that Ps(0) = Ps(1). Then
P(0) − s ≥ δ/2. (3)
Proof. We can solve for s to find that s = (P(0) − δ)/(1 − δ). Hence
P(0) − s = (1−P(0)) δ
1 − δ ≥ δ/2,
Where the inequality follows from the fact that since P(0) = P(1)+ δ ≤ 1−P(0)+ δ, it holds that
1− δ ≤ 2− 2P(0).
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We prove Theorem 3.1 below by calculating the derivative of Pt(f = 0) with respect to t and
then integrating between t = s and t = P(0). We thus interpolate between Ps, in which the
probability of 0 and a are equal, and P (= PP(0)), in which the probability of 0 is larger by δ than
the probability of a.
For a function g and a probability measure P, we will write P(g) for the expectation of g under
P.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since the conclusion of the theorem is only weakened when δ is reduced,
we can assume without loss of generality that the inequality P(0) ≥ P(i) + δ is tight and that
P(1) + δ = P(0). Choose s ∈ [0,P(0)] so that Ps(0) = Ps(1).
Define g = 1(f=0). Suppose (for now) that P(b) ≥ δ2q for all b ∈ [q], and so Pt(b) ≥ δ2q for all
s ≤ t ≤ P(0) and all b ∈ [q]. Since f is fair and monotone, Ps(g) ≥ 1/q. Using monotonicity again,
Pt(g) ≥ 1/q for all t ≥ s.
By Theorem 3.2, if ǫt := maxi∈[n] IiPt(g) < 1/10 for all i then
n∑
i=1
IiPt(g) ≥
C log(1/ǫt)
log(2q/δ)
VarPt(g) ≥
C log(1/ǫt)
q log(2q/δ)
Pt(1− g)
for all t ∈ [s,P(0)]. Now, recall that for A ∈ A, if i, j ∈ A then they play the same roˆle in f and
in particular have the same influence. Hence
∑
i=1 I
i
Pt
(g) ≥ mǫt, since |A| ≥ m for any A ∈ A. In
particular, if ǫt ≥ (logm)/m then
∑
i I
i
Pt
(g) ≥ logm; on the other hand, if ǫt ≤ (logm)/m then
the display above implies that
∑
i
IPt(g) ≥ Cq
logm
log(1/δ)
Pt(1− g), (4)
for some Cq that depends only on q. This last inequality (Eq. 4) holds, therefore, in either case.
On the other hand, Lemma 2.3 of [16] (a generalization of Russo’s formula) gives
∂Pt(g)
∂t
≥
∑
i=1
Ii
Pt
(g)
and so
∂Pt(g)
∂t
≥ Cq logm
log(1/δ)
Pt(1− g)
for all t ∈ [s,P(0)]. Integrating between s and t, we have
Pt(g) ≥ 1− 1
q
exp
(
−Cq logm
log(1/δ)
(t− s)
)
and so we conclude by setting t = P(0) and invoking Eq. (3).
Now, if the hypothesis P(b) ≥ δ2q fails then we construct P˜ by P˜(0) = P(0) − δ/2 and P˜(b) =
P(b)+ δ2(q−1) for b 6= 0. Setting δ˜ = δ/2, we see that P˜ satisfies the hypothesis of the theorem (with
δ replaced by δ˜) and it also satisfies P˜(b) ≥ δ˜2q . The proof goes through, then, and we can absorb
the extra factor of 2 into the constant Cq.
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3.1 Where aggregation fails
Let q = 2 and suppose that both the interaction mode and the election system are given by simple
majority votes. In this scenario, we prove Theorem 2.1 by giving an example with two social types,
one of which has a constant size as n →∞. Information will not aggregate asymptotically in this
example, and the reason for the failure will be the presence of the constant-sized social type.
Since q = 2, it will be more convenient to set p = 12+
δ
2 = P(0) and to write our example in terms
of p instead of in terms of δ. Let Gn = (A∪B,E), where |A| = 1/(1−p) and |B| = n(1/(1−p)+1).
Then in particular the number of vertices in Gn is at least n. We assume here that 1/(1− p) is an
integer.
Let each a ∈ A be connected to each b ∈ B, and let none of the vertices in A be connected to
each other. The vertices in B are arranged in n cliques, each of size 1/(1− p)+ 1, and there are no
edges between the cliques. Each vertex in B has a self-loop.
The degree of the vertices in B is odd, since each has edges to 2/(1 − p) + 1 edges. To make
the degrees in A odd add a vertex that is connected to all vertices in A. An isolated vertex can be
added to make the total number of vertices odd.
Henceforth we condition on the event that Xv(0) = 1 for all v ∈ A. Note that this happens
with probability (1− p)|A| = (1− p)1/(1−p).
Let C be one of the cliques of B. If at least one vertex w in C votes 1 initially (at time t = 0)
then all the vertices in C will vote 1 in the next round (t = 1); each will have at least 1/(1− p)+ 1
neighbors ({w} ∪ A) that vote 1 and at most 1/(1 − p) neighbors (B \ {w}) that vote 0. The
probability that at least one vertex in C votes 1 initially is 1 − p1/(1−p), which is greater than
1− 1/e, or about 0.63. Hence the number of cliques in which all vertices will vote 1 at time 1 will
be distributed Binom
(
n, 1− p1/(1−p)), which dominates the distribution Binom (n, 0.6).
By Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability that a majority of the cliques (and hence a majority
of the vertices) will vote 1 at time 1 is at least 1− exp(−0.02n). Once this happens, the vertices in
A will all vote 1 in all future iterations, and so will these cliques. Hence for all T ≥ 2 a majority
vote will result in 1.
The event that a majority of the cliques have a voter that initially votes 1 is independent of
the event that all vertices in A initially vote 1. Hence both events happen with probability at least
(1− p)1/(1−p)(1− exp(−0.02)). Since this quantity is positive and independent of n, it follows that
information does not aggregate and Theorem 2.1 is proved.
Berger [4] constructs an example of a family of graphs with n vertices. In each graph there exists
a set of at most 18 vertices (which he calls a dynamic monopoly), such that if all agents in this set
initially vote identically then, in majority dynamics with two alternatives, all the agents converge
to the initial vote of the dynamic monopoly. In particular, this implies that in this example, with
probability at least (1−p)18, aggregation fails for any n. This is another example of how aggregation
can fail when a particular social type has a small size (in this case at most 18).
4 The existence of monotone, fair and transitive aggregation func-
tions
Proposition 4.1. For all q ≥ 2 and n prime and strictly larger than q, there exists a monotone,
fair and transitive aggregation function f : [q]n → [q].
Proof. Let q ≥ 2 and let n > q be prime. Let f : [q]n → [q] be defined as follows.
For a = (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ [q]n let Q(a) be the set of alternatives that received the most votes. If
Q(a) = {b} is a singleton then let f(a) = b. Otherwise |Q(a)| ≥ 2. Let M(a) ⊂ [n] be the set of
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voters that voted for one of the alternatives in Q(a). Note that |M(a)| 6= n, since otherwise each
alternative received the same number of votes and so |Q(a)| divides n, which is impossible since
n is prime. Also, M(a) is clearly not the empty set, and so |M(a)| is an invertible element of the
field Zn. Let
k(a) =
1
|M(a)|
∑
i∈M(a)
i =
1
|M(a)|
∑
ai∈Q(a)
i
where addition and division are taken over the field Zn. Note that k(a) is the “average” position
of a voter that voted for one of the votes that received the most votes. Let
ℓ(a) = min{0 ≤ i < n : k(a) + i ∈M(a)},
where again the sum k(a) + i is taken over Zn. Finally, define
f(a) = ak(a)+ℓ(a).
By definition f(a) ∈ Q(a), and so f is the plurality function with some tie breaking rule, and is
therefore monotone. Also, none of the alternative names appear in its definition, and it is therefore
fair. It remains to show that it is transitive. We do this by showing that for each 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 < n
there exists a permutation τ = τi1,i2 on [n] such that τ(i1) = i2 and f(τ(a)) = f(a), where
τ(a) = (aτ(0), . . . , aτ(n−1)).
Let τi1,i2(i) = τ(i) = i − i1 + i2 mod n. Note that Q(τ(a)) = Q(a) and that M(τ(a)) =
τ−1(M(a)), so that |M(τ(a))| = |M(a)|. Hence
k(τ(a)) =
1
|M(τ(a))|
∑
i∈M(τ(a))
i
=
1
|M(a)|
∑
i∈τ−1(M(a))
i.
By a change of variables we get that
k(τ(a)) =
1
|M(a)|
∑
i∈M(a)
τ−1(i)
= k(a) + i1 − i2
= τ−1(k(a))
Next,
ℓ(τ(a)) = min{0 ≤ i < n : k(τ(a)) + i ∈M(τ(a))}
= min{0 ≤ i < n : k(a) + i1 − i2 + i ∈M(a) + i1 − i2}
= ℓ(a),
and finally, since τ(i+ j) = τ(i) + j:
f(τ(a)) = a
τ
(
k(τ(a))+ℓ(τ(a))
) = a
τ
(
k(τ(a))
)
+ℓ(a)
= ak(a)+ℓ(a) = f(a).
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5 On higher thresholds of agreement
In this section we again specialize to the case of q = 2 alternatives, and consider the question
of when it can be shown that, after a number of rounds of fair and monotone dynamics, a large
proportion of the population will agree on the correct alternative.
Consider the election system gα(x) = 1(
∑
i xi ≥ (1 − α)n). When α = 1/2, this is simply
the majority function, and so our earlier results apply, and under the appropriate conditions Y =
g(X1(T ), . . . ,X|V |(T )) will equal 0 with high probability. What about when α > 1/2? In this case
Y will equal 0 only if an α fraction of the population votes 0 at time T . When does this happen
with high probability?
Since gα satisfies the same transitivity properties as g1/2, the proof of Theorem 3.1 mostly still
applies. At least, the “sharp threshold” part of the claim is still true: there is some p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that P(0) > p∗ implies that P(Y = 0) →m(fn) 1. Since gα is no longer anti-symmetric, however,
we no longer know that the threshold occurs at p∗ = 1/2.
In this section, we will show that p∗ ≤ α, but we will also give a simple example for which
p∗ = 1− O((1 − α)2) as α → 1. Thus, there may be a large gap between our bound and the true
behavior of p∗.
The first step is to obtain a lower bound on E
∑
iXv(t). The argument here appeared in a
course taught by the first author in Fall 2010, although it may have been known before then. In
any case, we give a proof for completeness. For the rest of this section, Pp denotes the probability
distribution on {0, 1} satisfying Pp(0) = p, in which case δ = 2p − 1. As above, we also denote by
Pp the distribution over n i.i.d. random variables distributed Pp.
Lemma 5.1. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone function with P1/2(f = 0) ≥ 12 . Then
Pp(f = 0) ≥ p for all p ∈ [12 , 1].
Note that equality holds for the function f(x) = xi. In other words, every monotone function
aggregates information at least as well as a dictator function. It is easy to construct less pathological
examples that come arbitrarily close to achieving this bound.
Proof. By the chain rule,
∂Pp(f)
∂p
=
n∑
i=1
Pp(f(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, 0,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)− f(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, 1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn))
= − 1
p(1− p)
n∑
i=1
IiPp(f).
By the Efron-Stein inequality,
∑
Ii(f) ≥ Var(f), with equality only if f depends just on one
coordinate. If f depends just on one coordinate, then the proof is trivial, so we can suppose the
contrary. Thus ∂∂pPp(f) < − 1p(1−p)VarPp(f).
Suppose, for a contradiction, that 1 − Pp(f) = Pp(f = 0) < p for some p > 12 . Let r be the
infinum over all p satisfying the previous sentence. Since Pp(f) is a smooth function of p, it follows
that Pr(f) = 1 − r and so VarPr (f) = r(1 − r). Thus, ∂∂pPp(f)|p=r < −1, contradicting the
assumption that Pp(f) > 1− p for arbitrarily close p > r.
Note that for any vertex v and any t, the conditions of the lemma hold for f = Xv(t). Summing
over all v, we obtain the following:
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Corollary 5.2. Suppose that Xv(0) are independent Bernoulli variables with mean p ≥ 12 . Then,
for any t,
E
∑
v∈V
Xv(t) ≤ (1− p)|V |.
Combining this with the proof of Theorem 3.1, we arrive at the promised bound on the location
of the sharp threshold. Of course, this is just a restatement of Theorem 2.4.
Corollary 5.3. Let fn : [q]
n → q be a sequence of aggregation functions with monotone and fair
modes of interaction and election system gα as defined above. Suppose that limn→∞m(fn) = ∞,
and that p > α. Then Pp(Y = 0)→ 1 as n→∞.
Proof. For the sake of brevity, denote gǫ = gǫ(X1(T ), . . . ,X|V |(T )) (which equals Y for ǫ = α).
From the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have
∂Pp(gα = 0)
∂p
≥ C(logm)VarPp(gα).
On the other hand, Corollary 5.2 gives us that for any ǫ > 0
Pp(gp−ǫ = 0) = Pp
(∑
v∈V
Xv(t) ≤ (1− p+ ǫ)|V |
)
≥ ǫ
and so VarPp(gp−ǫ) ≥ ǫPp(gp−ǫ) for any ǫ.
Fix α < p and set ǫ = (p − α)/2. Then for any r ∈ [α + ǫ, p], VarPr(gα) ≥ ǫPr(gα) and so we
can solve the differential inequality
∂Pr(gα = 0)
∂r
≥ Cǫ(logm)Pr(gα)
in the range [p − ǫ, p], with initial condition Pp−ǫ(gα = 0) ≥ ǫ. We obtain
Pp(Y = 0) = Pp(gα = 0) ≥ 1− (1− ǫ) exp
(−Cǫ2 logm))
and we send m→∞.
5.1 An example: cycles
Let Gn be a cycle on n vertices, where each vertex has a self-loop, and recall that p =
1+δ
2 .
When the mode of interaction is majority dynamics, we can explicitly calculate the distribution
of limt→∞Xv(t). This will yield a wider bound (compared to Theorem 2.4) on the range of α for
which limn→∞ µδ(fn,α)→ 1. Of particular interest are the cases when δ → 0 or δ → 1; for small δ,
α < 12 +
5
6δ − Ω(δ3) turns out to imply limn→∞ µδ(fn,α)→ 1, while for large δ, if we set ǫ = 1− δ,
then α < 1− 12ǫ2 is sufficient. Therefore, the bound in Theorem 2.4 is not tight: for δ close to zero,
one can take α ≈ 12 + 56δ while Theorem 2.4 only guarantees that α = 12 + 12δ will work; for δ close
to 1, α ≈ 1− 12ǫ2 is sufficient, but Theorem 2.4 only gives α = 1− 12ǫ.
The analysis of the cycle is relatively simple because the eventual state of the voters can be easily
foretold from the initial state. First of all, whenever two (or more) adjacent voters share the same
opinion, they will retain that opinion forever. Moreover, strings of voters whose opinions alternate
will gradually turn into strings of voters with the same opinion, as in the following example:
time t · · · 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 · · ·
time t+ 1 · · · 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 · · ·
time t+ 2 · · · 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 · · ·
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In fact, one can tell the eventual opinion of a voter v with the following simple rule: let V ≥ 0 be
the smallest number such that Xv−V = Xv−V −1 and let W ≥ 0 be the smallest number such that
Xv+W = Xv+W+1 (assuming that such V andW exist, which will only fail to happen in the unlikely
event that the whole cycle consists of alternating opinions). If V ≤ W then Xv(t) = Xv−V (0) for
all t ≥ V . On the other hand, if W ≤ V then Xv(t) = Xv+W (0) for all t ≥ W . (If V = W then
Xv−V (0) = Xv+W (0) because Xv−V (0) = Xv(0) if and only if V is even, and similarly for W .)
Proposition 5.4. For any v,
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞P(Xv(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T ) =
2p2 − p3
1− p+ p2 =
1
2
+
5δ − δ3
6 + 2δ2
= 1− 4ǫ
2 − ǫ3
8− 4ǫ+ 2ǫ2 .
As we observed following Corollary 5.2, this implies that if α < 12 +
5δ−δ3
6+2δ2
and the number of
interaction rounds is sufficiently large (depending on α and p), then µδ(fn,α)→ 1.
Proof. For brevity, we will write Xv instead of Xv(0) for the initial state of vertex v. Instead of
majority dynamics on the cycle, consider majority dynamics on Z; we will see later that these are
essentially the same when n is large. We may assume without loss of generality that v = 0. As in
the discussion above, let V ≥ 0 be minimal such that X−V = X−V−1 and let W ≥ 0 be minimal
such that XW = XW+1.
Let us first condition on X0(0) = 0. Consider the i.i.d. sequence
Yk = (X−2k,X1−2k,X2k−1,X2k) ∈ {0, 1}4.
If Y1, . . . , Yj = (0, 1, 1, 0) then the sequence X−2j , . . . ,X2j consists of alternating zeros and ones,
and so V,W ≥ 2j. Define A0, A1 ⊂ {0, 1}4 by
A0 = {(a, b, c, d) : b = 0 or c = 0}
A1 = {(a, b, c, d) : a = b = c = 1 or b = c = d = 1}
Note that A0 ∩A1 = ∅ and {0, 1}4 \ (A0 ∪A1) = {(0, 1, 1, 0)}. Therefore, if J is minimal such that
YJ 6= (0, 1, 1, 0) then YJ is in either A0 or A1. If YJ ∈ A0 then either W = 2J − 2 and XW = 0:
X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · X2J−3 X2J−2 X2J−1
0 1 0 1 0 · · · 1 0 0
or V = 2J − 2 and X−V = 0:
X−(2J−1) X−(2J−2) X−(2J−3) · · · X−4 X−3 X−2 X−1 X0
0 0 1 · · · 0 1 0 1 0
In either of these cases, X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 2J − 2. Conversely, if YJ ∈ A1 then either XW = 1
or XV = 1 and X0(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 2J − 1. Thus, (using the fact that J and YJ are independent)
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) = P(YJ ∈ A0)P(2J − 2 ≤ T ). (5)
Since the Yj are i.i.d,
P(YJ ∈ A0) = P(Y1 ∈ A0)
P(Y1 ∈ A0 ∪A1) =
2p− p2
2p − p2 + 2(1− p)3 − (1− p)4 =
2p− p2
1− p2 + 2p3 − p4 , (6)
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where we have computed P(Y1 ∈ Ai) by the inclusion/exclusion formulas
P(Y1 ∈ A0) = P(X−1 = 0) +P(X1 = 0)−P(X−1 = X1 = 0)
P(Y1 ∈ A1) = P(X−2 = X−1 = X1 = 1) +P(X−1 = X1 = X2 = 1)−P(X−2 = · · · = X2 = 1).
The case for X0 = 1 is similar: we define
A′0 = {(a, b, c, d) : a = b = c = 0 or b = c = d = 0}
A′1 = {(a, b, c, d) : b = 1 or c = 1}.
If J ′ is minimal such that YJ ′ 6= (1, 0, 0, 1) then YJ ′ ∈ A′0 implies X0(t) = 0 for t ≥ 2J ′ − 1, while
YJ ′ ∈ A′1 implies X0(t) → 1 for t ≥ 2J ′ − 2. Since P(Y1 ∈ A′0) = 2p3 − p4 and P(Y1 ∈ A′1) =
2(1− p)− (1− p)2, we have
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 1)
P(2J − 1 ≤ T ) =
P(Y1 ∈ A′0)
P(Y1 ∈ A′0 ∩A′1)
=
2p3 − p4
1− p2 + 2p3 − p4 . (7)
To transition back from dynamics on Z to dynamics on the n-cycle, note that the event {X0(t) =
0 for all t ≥ T} is the same event on Z and on the n-cycle, provided that n > 2T . In particular, (5)
and (6) imply that
lim
n→∞P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) = P(2J − 2 ≤ T )
2p − p2
1− p2 + 2p3 − p4
for majority dynamics on the n-cycle (and similarly conditioned on X0 = 1, using (7). Since
limT→∞P(2J − 2 ≤ T ) = 1,
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) =
2p − p2
1− p2 + 2p3 − p4 .
(and similarly conditioned on X0 = 1). Finally,
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T )
= pP(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) + (1− p)P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 1) → 2p
2 − p3
1− p+ p2
as T, n→∞. The formulas in terms of δ and ǫ are obtained by substituting p = 1+δ2 = 1− ǫ2 .
6 Expander graphs converge to unanimity
6.1 Majority dynamics with two alternatives
In this section we again consider the case that q = 2 and majority dynamics (i.e., each voter adopts
the majority opinion of its neighbors), with a population wide majority vote at time T . To avoid
the issue of ties, we assume that |Nv| is odd for all v and that n is odd.
Let G be a graph and M its adjacency matrix, so that Mvu is 1 if (u, v) ∈ E and 0 otherwise.
We say that G is a λ-expander if the second-largest absolute eigenvalue of M is at most λ (cf. [11]).
Expander graphs have particularly nice properties under the iterated majority dynamics. One
reason for this is that in an expander graph, the number of edges between disjoint sets A and B of
vertices is almost completely determined by the cardinalities of A and B. We state this formally
in Lemma 6.1 below.
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Denote E(A,B) = 1TAM1B , where A and B be sets of vertices. Note that if A and B are
disjoint then E(A,B) is the number of edges between A and B, and if A and B are not disjoint,
then E(A,B) double-counts edges from A ∩ B to itself). Alternatively, E(A,B) is the number of
“edge-ends” of edges with one end in A and another in B.
Recall that a graph d-regular if all vertices have degree d, i.e., |Nv| = d for all v ∈ V .
Lemma 6.1 (Expander mixing lemma (cf. [2])). If G is a d-regular λ-expander with n vertices
then ∣∣∣E(A,B)− |A||B|d
n
∣∣∣ ≤ λ√|A||B|
for every A,B ⊂ G.
It follows easily from the expander mixing lemma that medium-sized majorities are unstable
under iterated majority dynamics. That is, if a reasonable majority of people prefer one outcome
then very quickly a large majority of people will prefer that outcome.
Proposition 6.2. Let q = 2, let n be odd, let G be a d-regular λ-expander with d odd, and let the
mode of interaction be majority dynamics with a majority vote at time T .
Let N0(t) be the number of agents that vote 0 at time t and let N1(t) be the number of agents
that vote 1. If N0(t) ≥ N1(t) + αn then N1(t+ 1) ≤ 2λ2α2d2n.
Proof. Let A0(t) be the set of agents that vote 0 at time t, and define A1(t) similarly. Then, by
the nature of majority dynamics, every v ∈ A1(t+ 1) has more than half of its neighbors in A1(t).
Summing over every v ∈ A1(t+1), we have E(A1(t+1), A1(t)) ≥ E(A1(t+1), A0(t)). By applying
the expander mixing lemma to both sides,
N1(t+ 1)N0(t)d
n
− λ
√
N1(t+ 1)N0(t) ≤ N1(t+ 1)N1(t)d
n
+ λ
√
N1(t+ 1)N1(t).
Rearranging, and since N0(t)−N1(t) ≥ αn,
α
√
N1(t+ 1) ≤ λ
d
(
√
N1(t) +
√
N0(t)) ≤ λ
d
√
2n.
Applying the proposition twice, we see that an imbalance of 4λnd implies that a large, stable
majority will form within one time-step.
Corollary 6.3. If N0(t) ≥ N1(t) + 4λnd and λd ≤ 316 then N1(s) ≤ n8 for all s ≥ t+ 1.
Proof. Taking α = 4λd in Proposition 6.2, we have N1(t+1) ≤ n8 . Then N0(t+1) ≥ N1(t+1)+ 3n4 ≥
4λn
d and so we can continue applying Proposition 6.2 indefinitely with α =
4λ
d .
In order to show that a complete consensus is eventually achieved, we will use a result of [9],
who proved that majority dynamics will eventually enter a cycle with period at most two.
Proposition 6.4. If λd ≤ 316 and N0(t)−N1(t) ≥ 4λnd for some t, then majority dynamics converge
to all 0.
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Proof. Since majority dynamics converge to a cycle with period at most two, we can divide the
vertices of G into four sets: A00 is the set of nodes that converge to 0, A11 is the set that converge
to 1, with A01 and A10 being the two sets of nodes that eventually alternate between 0 and 1. By
Corollary 6.3, |A11| + max{|A01|, |A10|} ≤ n8 , and so |Ac00| = |A11| + |A01| + |A10| ≤ n4 . By the
expander mixing lemma,
|E(Ac00, Ac00)| ≤ |Ac00|2
d
n
+ λ|Ac00| ≤ |Ac00|
(
d
4
+ λ
)
.
On the other hand, |E(A00, Ac00)|+ |E(Ac00, Ac00)| = d|Ac00| and so |E(A00, Ac00)| ≥ |Ac00|(3d4 −λ).
Since λ ≤ d/4, |E(A00, Ac00)| ≥ d2 |Ac00|. Supposing that Ac00 is non-empty, there must be at least
one vertex v ∈ Ac00 with more than half of its neighbors in A00. But then the definition of majority
dynamics would imply that v converges to 0, a contradiction. Thus Ac00 must be empty, and all
agents converge to 0.
In particular, a random d-regular graph has λ = O(
√
d) with high probability. Therefore, if we
start with an initial bias such that P(0)− 12 & d−1/2 then iterated majority on a random d-regular
graph will converge to all 0 with high probability.
6.2 Plurality dynamics on expanders
The results of the previous section can be extended with little effort to the case of more than
two alternatives. The main obstacle in making this extension is specifying the resolution of ties.
With two alternatives, we avoid the possibility of ties in majority dynamics simply by requiring
each vertex to have odd degree. With more than two alternatives, the simplest way to avoid ties
is to perturb the edge weights slightly so that they are rationally independent. Our expansion
assumptions can be easily extended to the weighted case: let M be the weighted adjacency matrix
of G and assume that all of its entries on or above the main diagonal are rationally independent of
one another. Let d be the largest absolute eigenvalue of M and let λ be the second-largest. Note
that if M was constructed by perturbing the edge weights of a random regular graph, then d will
be approximately the degree of the graph and λ will be O(
√
d).
With the assumptions above, Lemma 6.1 holds exactly as it was stated above, and so the proof
of Proposition 6.2 applies also.
Proposition 6.5. For a ∈ [q], let Na(t) be the number of people that vote a at time t. If Na(t) ≥
1+α
2 n then Na(t+ 1) ≥ n(1− 2λ
2
α2d2
)
To get an extension of Proposition 6.4, we first need to extend the periodicity result [9] to the
case of several alternatives. This extension uses exactly the same argument as [9], but we include
it for completeness.
Proposition 6.6. On a weighted graph with no ties, iterated plurality dynamics converge to a cycle
of length at most 2.
Proof. Consider the quantity
Jv(t) =
∑
a∈[q]
(
(1{Xv(t+1)=a} − 1{Xv(t−1)=a})
∑
w∼v
ewv1{Xw(t)=a}
)
,
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where ewv is the weight of the edge between v and w. Note that Jv(t) ≥ 0 with equality if, and
only if, Xv(t+1) = Xv(t− 1). Indeed, if Xv(t+1) = Xv(t− 1) then Jv(t) = 0 trivially, so suppose
that Xv(t+ 1) = a and Xv(t− 1) = b 6= a. Then
Jv(t) =
∑
{w∼v:Xw(t)=a}
ewv −
∑
{w∼v:Xw(t)=b}
ewv.
Since Xv(t+ 1) = a and the edge weights are chosen to ensure that ties never happen, this implies
that Jv(t) > 0.
Now consider J(t) =
∑
v Jv(t). Note that if we define
L(t) =
∑
v
∑
w∼v
∑
a∈[q]
ewv1{Xv(t+1)=a}1{Xw(t)=a}
then J(t) = L(t) − L(t − 1). Since the state space of the dynamics is finite and the dynamics are
deterministic, the process eventually (by time T , say) converges to a cycle (of period k, say). Then
T+k∑
t=T+1
J(t) =
T+k∑
t=T+1
L(t)−
T+k−1∑
t=T
L(t) = 0,
since the states are identical at time T and T + k, and thus L(T ) = L(T + k). Since J(t) ≥ 0 for
every t, it follows that J(T +1) = 0. Then Jv(T +1) = 0 for every v and so the state at time T +2
is identical to the state at time T .
With Proposition 6.6 in hand, the rest of the proof of Proposition 6.4 goes through in the
q-alternative case. We only note that we need to replace A01 by the set Aa∗ = {v : Xv(2t) = a 6=
Xv(2t+ 1) for large enough t}.
Proposition 6.7. If λd ≤ 316 and Na(t) ≥ n(12+ 2λd ) for some t then the plurality dynamics converge
to a.
In particular, if we take a random d-regular graph and perturb each edge weight by at most
n−3, then the second eigenvalue will hardly change, so we will still have λ = O(
√
d). If P(Xv(0) =
a) ≥ P(Xv(0) = b) + c
√
log q√
d
for every b 6= a then at time t = 1, with high probability most of the
vertices will prefer a and Proposition 6.7 will imply that the plurality dynamics will converge to
all a.
6.3 A stronger result for expanders with large girth
In Section 6.1 we proved that in majority dynamics with two alternatives, an initial bias of d−1/2
is sufficient (on a random d-regular graph) for consensus in the limit. Kanoria and Montanari [17]
showed that on an infinite d-regular tree, the required bias is much smaller as a function of d:
Theorem 6.8 (Kanoria and Montanari). Let v be a vertex in an infinite d-regular tree. For any
β > 0 and all sufficiently large d, if P(0) ≥ 12 + d−β then with probability one, Xv(t) = 0 for all
sufficiently large t.
Using this, it is easy to improve our earlier bias requirement for consensus from P(0)− 12 & d−1/2
to P(0) − 12 & d−β for any β > 0:
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Corollary 6.9. For every d, let Gn,d be a sequence of d-regular λ-expanders with
λ
d ≤ 316 , such that
the girth of Gn,d tends to infinity with n. For any β > 0, if p ≥ 12 + d−β then for all sufficiently
large d, with high probability (as n→∞) the iterated majority process on Gn,d will converge to all
0.
Proof. Choose d large enough (depending on β) so that Theorem 6.8 applies, then choose T large
enough so that P(Xv(T ) = 0) ≥ 12+ C√d on the d-regular tree, for some constant C to be determined.
By choosing n large enough, we can ensure that the girth of Gn,d is larger than T ; thus P(Xv(T ) =
0) ≥ 12 + C√d for every v ∈ Gn,d. Then the expected fraction of nodes that are 0 by time T is at
least 12 +
C√
d
, since at time T each node only depends on the initial values of nodes within a ball
of radius T . Since the number of such nodes is bounded as n → ∞, McDiarmid’s inequality [20]
implies that with high probability, at least 12 +
C−1√
d
fraction of nodes are 0 at time T . If we choose
C large enough, Proposition 6.4 implies that the dynamics converge to all 0.
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